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In 410 Alaric, King of the Goths, and his army infamously sacked Rome, the once grand 
capitol of the world. This devastating incident for the Romans had long repercussions in terms of 
its historical memory. Early medieval writers like St. Augustine of Hippo would reflect on the 
meaning of the sack of Rome. Alaric died soon after, before the establishment of the Gothic 
kingdom that replaced the Roman state in the West. Contrary to the thought of the sack’s 
grandeur importance, however, Godden notes that “The sack of Rome was by all accounts of 
little material significance in the long and complex history of Roman engagement with 
barbarians.”1 The sack of the city rather overshadowed the importance of Alaric’s journey to that 
moment. He was able to both plunder the area which is now Greece and also hold a peaceful pact 
with Stilicho, the commander of the armies of the Western Empire under Honorius. Through 
Alaric we can understand the vulnerable state of the Roman Empire and the disassociation of its 
separated halves. Alaric exposes the weak structure of the Empire through the years 395 to 410 
by his lootings, foedus with Stilicho, and his campaign to invade Italy, the heart of the Western 
Empire. 
Historical sources around the time of Alaric are quite limited. The poet Claudian is one of 
the few people that lived during the time of Alaric and Stilicho whose works have been 
preserved.  The Egyptian Claudius Claudianus, or Claudian, became a court poet for the Western 
Empire and served Stilicho, the overly praised subject of his poetic works.2 Claudian’s work is 
the only source that ends before the sack of Rome and therefore is not affected by the 
retrospection of the event.3 Thus Claudian contributes the events before the sack, despite his 
grand distortion of events towards Stilicho’s favor. Olympiodorus of Thebes also lived around 
                                                 
1 M. R. Godden. “The Anglo-Saxons and the Goths: Rewriting the Sack of Rome.” In Anglo-Saxon England, 47-68. 
(Cambridge University Press, 2002), 47 
2 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007),  160-161 
3 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 161 
Sass 3 
 
this time; however, his works have only been preserved in several fragments, beginning with the 
death of Stilicho. Olympiodorus’ work is special in that it lacks prejudice towards Stilicho and 
the barbarians and instead contains his own independent judgment of the events.4 The work of 
Olympiodorus therefore takes the stance of observing history rather than distorting the facts 
towards one side or another, making the fragments more trustworthy. The next closest historical 
work of this time, the Gallic Chronicle of 452, comes from an anonymous Gaul writer.5 This 
chronicle focuses only on what the writer perceived to be largely important events for each year 
rather than giving a historical narrative of the events. For this reason the events can be noted as 
true, however the author is not reliable with the exact years and dates of the events.6 One of the 
most thorough narrative historical authors is Zosimus, who was one of the last pagan historians.7 
Zosimus writes a lengthy narrative about the events and ends his work before the sack of Rome 
occurs. Bus his work is not entirely trustworthy as he wrote at least a hundred years after the 
events; thus Zosimus only compiled contemporary sources such as Olympiodorus and added in 
his own bias about what had occurred.8 Although Zosimus’ work is consequently problematic, it 
still contains essential events and facts in lengthy narratives. Thus Zosimus’ large knowledge of 
contemporary sources led him to draw his own conclusions, most specifically about the enmity 
between Stilicho and Rufinus. 
The separation of the Roman Empire was already evident before Alaric’s revolt in part by 
the death of the Emperor Theodosius. Theodosius died in 395, ending seventeen years as 
                                                 
4 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), li 
5 Alexander Callander Murray, trans. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader. (Canada: Broadview Press Ltd., 
2000), 76 
6 Ibid. 
7 Zosimus. Historia Nova. Translated by James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis. (San Antonio: Trinity University 
Press, 1967), ix 
8 Peter Heather. “The Creation of the Visigoths.” In The Visigoths, edited by Peter Heather, 43-92. (San Marino: The 
Boydell Press, 1999), 48 
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Emperor.9 Theodosius’ sons then became the Emperors of the Empire, Arcadius in the East and 
Honorius in the West. This division of the Empire between the sons set up the further 
disassociation of the halves. Zosimus describes how the actual rulers of the halves of the Empire 
were the guardians of the sons, Rufinus in the East and Stilicho in the West.10 He tells that both 
of the guardians had individual secret plans to capture all of the power of the Empire for 
themselves. To achieve their goals, both Rufinus and Stilicho decided to increase their stake at 
power through marriage. Rufinus, however, was not able to secure his daughter in marriage to 
the Emperor Arcadius.11 In the Western Empire Stilicho did manage to give his daughter, 
Thermantia, in marriage to Honorius, “and his power became greater still.”12 So Stilicho 
effectively tied himself further to the Emperor Honorius, and to power, on top of already being 
the “Count and Master of all Soldiers”13 in the Western Empire. Stilicho’s power would be 
shown to great extents in his dealings with Alaric and his plans against the Eastern Empire at the 
start of the 5th century. The rivalry between Stilicho and the guardians of the Eastern Empire, 
Rufinus and then Eutropius, shows the further split between the halves of the Empire. It is after 
the creation of the separation of the Empire in 395 that Alaric begins his revolt. 
The lootings of Alaric and his army in Greece show the weak and separate structure of 
the Empire, specifically the Eastern half. In 395 Alaric decided to revolt against Roman 
authority. According to Zosimus, Alaric was angry because he was not promoted to a higher 
status in charge of more soldiers after helping to win the battle against Eugenius when 
                                                 
9 Alexander Callander Murray, trans. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader. (Canada: Broadview Press Ltd., 
2000), 79 
10 Zosimus. Historia Nova. Translated by James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis. (San Antonio: Trinity University 
Press, 1967), 193 
11 Ibid., 195 
12 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
5 
13 Adrian Goldsworthy. How Rome Fell. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 290 
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Theodosius was still alive.14 Up to the year 397 Alaric and his army, whose soldiers were based 
in the Eastern Empire’s controlled Balkans,15 looted and burned the towns of Greece.16 Alaric 
was, for the most part, free to loot Greece for over a year with little confrontation. Zosimus 
informs that Rufinus did not stop Alaric’s conquest because he supposed that “with the 
commonwealth thrown into utter confusion, no roadblock would appear against his enterprise,” 
17 (his plan to have the Roman throne for himself). But Rufinus never had the chance to take 
over the throne, because another plot was brewing within the Western Empire. Stilicho decided 
to assassinate Rufinus by informing Honorius that he should “send some military cohorts to his 
brother Arcadius to assist the nations under his sway that were in sorry case.”18 The sorry cases 
of these nations were due to Alaric’s pillaging. These soldiers, led by Gainas (who was in on 
Stilicho’s plan) then marched to Constantinople and murdered Rufinus.19 Thus Stilicho used 
Alaric’s devastation of Greece to successfully plan Rufinus’ murder, thereby weakening the 
other half of the Empire. But Constantinople’s regency was soon filled by Eutropius, Arcadius’ 
grand chamberlain.20 Stilicho still did not help the East defeat Alaric even after Rufinus’ death, 
and instead decided that “leaving him at large could only help undermine Eutropius” since Alaric 
was no threat to the Western half of the Empire yet.21 Stilicho’s plot to kill Rufinus shows how 
separated the Empire is at this point, especially since each side had their own goals to obtain 
power. But even though the Empire’s leaders were hardly unified, the lands of the Empire 
                                                 
14 Zosimus. Historia Nova. Translated by James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis. (San Antonio: Trinity University 
Press, 1967), 197 
15 Walter Goffart. “The Barbarians in Late Antiquity and How They Were Accommodated in the West.” In Debating 
the Middle Ages: Issues and Readings, edited by Lester K. Little and Barbara H. Rosenwein, 25-44. (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 27 
16 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 45 
17 Zosimus. Historia Nova. Translated by James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis. (San Antonio: Trinity University 
Press, 1967), 199 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 166 
21 Ibid. 
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between Rome and Constantinople still needed to be, so Alaric could no longer be left at large.22 
The Eastern Empire then decided to make Alaric magister militum per Illyricum, or master of 
soldiers in Illyricum, and “was also given imperial authority to oversee the public services of 
these lands, arms, shops, storage facilities and the like.”23 Part of the reason for his new status 
was that the Empire had no soldiers available to control that part of the Empire, so they used 
Alaric’s force.24 The fact that Alaric, who was allowed to steal Greece’s wealth, was given an 
important status in the Empire, that was only subordinate to the praetorian prefect,25 
demonstrates how needy the East’s weak position truly was. The East could not muster the forces 
necessary to even attack Alaric’s forces, and in the end resorted to dealing with Alaric by 
appeasing him, until he was no longer needed. 
After 399 Alaric no longer had a status in the Empire in Illyricum,26 and decided to 
invade Italy in 401.27 The battles of 402 ultimately led to Alaric and Stilicho striking a deal, 
where Alaric receives a title in the Empire, and, in return, Alaric helps Stilicho invade the East, 
which never occurred in part by Arcadius’ death. Stilicho’s desire to invade the East shows the 
lack of unity with both sides the Empire. Stilicho obviously saw the Eastern side of the Empire 
as a distinct governmental body. If he had not made this distinction, then a plan to invade the 
East would not have been necessary since he was the guardian of the Emperor Honorius. During 
the first battle, at Pollentia, Stilicho’s army surprised Alaric on Easter day.28 Instead of 
destroying Alaric and his army, Stilicho made a truce with Alaric and withdrew.29 Claudian, 
however, tells that “Alaric, his hopes ruined by his bloody defeat at Pollentia, though policy 
                                                 
22 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 187 
23 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 45 
24 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 187 
25 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 45 
26 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 183 
27 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 46 
28 Ibid. 
29 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 170 
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dictated that his life should be spared, was nevertheless deserted by all his allies and bereft of all 
his resources. He was forced to leave Latium and to retrace his steps in ruin.”30 The truth of this 
“bloody” battle is under some dispute. Later that year, at Verona, Stilicho’s army surrounded 
Alaric and his soldiers on a hill.31 Alaric and Stilicho made a deal, a foedus, at Verona, but what 
this deal entailed is disputed among scholars. But what can be supported is that this secretive 
deal gave Alaric a title in the Roman Empire. The power-aspiring Alaric would accept such a 
title since he “embarked on explorations” to obtain authority, given to him by already “existing 
Roman hegemonic bodies.”32 Instead of creating his own powerful state, Alaric wanted to gain 
power from already powerful governmental institutions. Burns supposes that Stilicho made 
Alaric comes rei militarisi in Illyricum in order to have soldiers stationed in that area so that 
Alaric would be “between the East and West effectively blocking an invasion or…poised to 
launch one to the East.33 But Wolfram concludes that Stilicho made Alaric the magister militum 
per Illyricum because Stilicho wanted to separate from Constantinople, and, furthermore, giving 
Alaric this title would violate the East’s autonomy since Illyricum was under the Eastern 
Empire’s jurisdiction.34 Whichever title Alaric received, both scholars agree that Stilicho 
planned to attack the East. Olympiodorus of Thebes does not take in to account this deal of 
invasion and instead informs that “Alaric the phylarch of the Goths was summoned to occupy 
Illyricum for Honorius, because Illyricum had been assigned to his Empire by his father 
                                                 
30 Claudius Claudianus, Claudian. Translated by Maurice Platnauer, vol. 2. (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1817), 
83 
31 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 46 
32 Hagith Sivan. “Alaricus Rex: Legitimizing a Gothic King.” In The Construction of Communities in the Early 
Middle Ages, edited by Richard Corradini, Max Diesenberger, and Helmut Reimitz, 109-121. (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 
112-113 
33 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 193 
34 Herwig Wolfram. History of the Goths. Translated by Thomas J. Dunlap. (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1988), 153 
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Theodosius.”35 This statement shows no tension between the two sides of the Empire, when there 
should have been tension, since Illyricum was a part of the Eastern Empire. Olympiodorus 
neither states the reason for Alaric’s assignment to this area. However, Zosimus agrees that 
Stilicho was plotting against his enemies in the West as he informs that “Stilicho was preparing 
to take his army over to the cities of Illyria and with Alaric’s help to wrest them from Arcadius 
and gain them for Honorius’ realm.”36 But this invasion never occurred since there was a rumor 
that Alaric was dead and Constantine was rebelling in Gaul.37 Even though the invasion did not 
occur, the fact that Stilicho was planning to take over lands that were in the power of the East 
with Alaric’s help shows a significant separation between the sides of the Empire. If the Empire 
had been unified, then plots to attack one side or the other would not have occurred. At this time 
the Empire lacked cooperation and instead strived for each side’s own plans.  
In addition to the lack of unification, the West showed itself to be in a dire predicament 
with Constantine. After Alaric stopped his march eastwards because of word of Arcadius’ death 
in 408,38 Alaric demanded money for the campaign.39 Olympiodorus states that Alaric received 
four thousand pounds of gold from the West.40 But this money never was given.41 In place of the 
invasion of the East, the West was forced to “concentrate all its resources on quashing 
Constantine’s rebellion,” and so was forced to give up Stilicho’s plans of invasion.42 Alaric was 
appointed the master of soldiers in Gaul by the West and was supposed to lead the attack against 
                                                 
35 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
7 
36 Zosimus. Historia Nova. Translated by James J. Buchanan and Harold T. Davis. (San Antonio: Trinity University 
Press, 1967), 222 
37 Ibid. 
38 Philip Matyszak. The Enemies of Rome. (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2004), 263 
39 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 215 
40 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
14 
41 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 47 
42 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 223 
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the usurper Constantine, but this did not occur either.43 In a twist of events Stilicho was 
murdered in 408 due to a charge of treason, effectively eliminating one of the finest commanders 
in the Roman army. The Gallic Chronicle simply states that the death of Stilicho was “in the 
interests of the state.”44 But Olympiodorus tells that Olympius led the “bloody and inhuman 
plot” to kill Stilicho.45 Olympius was a Magister Officiorum, a bureaucratic head of a 
government department in the Empire.46 Stilicho’s death left Rome nearly defenseless while 
hoards of Goths crossed into the Empire and while Constantine rebelled. The Gallic Chronicle 
even states that this “host of enemies” weakened the Empire “to their very foundation.”47 His 
death also ended the foedus with Alaric, as Stilicho was the one figure that promoted the 
continuation of this deal. The end of the foedus would prove disastrous for the Western Empire. 
Now that Roman leaders had demonstrated their weak position by killing their most 
capable general during Constantine’s usurpation, Alaric found a pristine opportunity to take 
advantage of the Empire’s weak state. Stilicho was no longer alive to stop Alaric from attacking 
with his army. Thus Alaric’s true invasion of Italy with his forces demonstrates the crippled state 
of the West. The events that followed the invasion, specifically the negotiations with Honorius 
and the sieges of Rome, demonstrate the weakness of the West. Isidore of Seville supposed that 
Alaric decided to attack Rome because “now that Radagaisus was dead, Alaric, his colleague in 
kingship, who was a Christian in name but professed himself a heretic, grieving that so great a 
number of Goths had been slain by the Romans, waged war against Rome to avenge his 
                                                 
43 Daniel Costa. The Lost Gold of Rome. (England: Sutton, 2007), 47 
44 Alexander Callander Murray, trans. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader. (Canada: Broadview Press 
Ltd., 2000), 80 
45 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
5 
46 Adrian Goldsworthy. How Rome Fell. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 299 
47 Alexander Callander Murray, trans. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader. (Canada: Broadview Press 
Ltd., 2000), 80 
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countrymen’s blood.”48 But this summary of events is not historically accurate about Alaric’s 
true reason. Radagaisus died in 406,49 years before Alaric’s invasion of Rome and still during the 
time when Alaric and Stilicho had their foedus in place. Furthermore, the relationship of 
Radagaisus and Alaric has been analyzed to suggest that Alaric held Radagaisus “as a competitor 
for leadership over any still restless barbarians on Roman soil,”50 not a comrade. Alaric’s 
invasion of the West was certainly not caused by the need for revenge. Olympiodorus of Thebes 
explains Alaric’s actions by stating that “because of Stilicho’s murder, and because he did not 
receive what had been agreed, Alaric besieged Rome.”51 Olympiodorus’ explanation is 
drastically different from Isidore’s simple summary about receiving vengeance. After Stilicho’s 
death, Alaric must have felt angry, and as he marched to Rome, his army grew in size with the 
addition of more fellow barbarians.52 Alaric was angry because he no longer held a beneficial 
relationship with the West. Stilicho’s punishment of death because of his treason discredited 
Alaric aiding the Empire, and so Honorius disbanded the agreement with Alaric and rejected any 
notion to negotiate.53 This refusal to negotiate would prove fatal to the Empire, as Honorius did 
not prepare for war and Alaric’s army was now reinforced with the army of his brother-in-law 
Athaulf.54 When the preliminary negotiations were not successful, Alaric decided to increase his 
demands and so he wanted the imperial title of “magisterium utriusque militiae, or commander 
of both services,” that had been Stilicho’s title before his death, but was again rejected.55 After 
these rejections, Alaric grew bolder and even appointed his own Emperor, the Roman Priscus 
                                                 
48 Isidore of Seville. History of the Goths, Vandals, and Suevi. Translated by Guido Donini and Gordon B. Ford. 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1970), 8-9 
49 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 171 
50 Thomas S. Burns. Barbarians within the Gates of Rome. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 197 
51 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
25 
52 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 173 
53 Adrian Goldsworthy. How Rome Fell. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 299 
54 Ibid. 
55 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 174-175 
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Attalus, who was the prefect of Rome.56 That Alaric could even have enough power to make 
himself able to institute new Emperors showed his power over the West, as “no barbarian 
monarch had previously aspired” to this level.57 But creating his own Emperor did not help in the 
negotiations. On the way to negotiate with Honorius yet again in 410, Alaric and his army were 
attacked by Sarus, another Gothic general, and it was at this point where Alaric decided that 
negotiating was futile and so turned his army against Rome for the final time.58 An estimation of 
the population of the city of Rome during the second half of the fourth century comes to around a 
million inhabitants.59 The large size of the city informs how many people were subjected to the 
siege by Alaric. The anonymous Gaul writer had this to say: “Finally, the capital of the world, 
Rome herself, was most foully exposed to sack at the hands of the Goths.”60 However most foul 
the siege was, it could very well have been prevented if the negotiations had been successful in 
coming to some sort of a compromise. But the siege also could have been prevented if Stilicho 
had not been murdered and if Honorius had sent an army to counterattack Alaric. Honorius’ lack 
of compromise and lack of forming an army against Alaric can be seen as showing his 
incompetency as a ruler and his weak position to lead the disassociated Empire. Alaric shows the 
weakness of the West by his ability to demonstrate his own powers. Alaric had the power to 
successfully attack the Western Empire and also to instate his own Emperor. During these 
demonstrations of power, Alaric met no resistance on the battlefield. The West was not strong 
                                                 
56 Christopher Chaffin. Olympiodorus of Thebes and the Sack of Rome. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), 
54 
57 Hagith Sivan. “Alaricus Rex: Legitimizing a Gothic King.” In The Construction of Communities in the Early 
Middle Ages, edited by Richard Corradini, Max Diesenberger, and Helmut Reimitz, 109-121. (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 
118 
58 Michael Kulikowski. Rome’s Gothic Wars. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 177 
59 Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse. “The Decline of the Western Empire.” In Debating the Middle Ages: 
Issues and Readings, edited by Lester K. Little and Barbara H. Rosenwein, 58-72. (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998), 70 
60 Alexander Callander Murray, trans. From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader. (Canada: Broadview Press 
Ltd., 2000), 81 
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enough to stop Alaric’s invasion, revealing its weakness. The East did not step in to stop Alaric 
either, which shows the East’s separation from the other side of the Empire. 
The events from 395 to 410 are critical in order to understand the weak position of the 
Empire. Alaric successfully looted the East of its treasures and then invaded the Western Empire, 
starving Rome, while gaining imperial titles in between these events. Alaric demonstrates how a 
barbarian leader could upset the Empire in its weak state through such lootings and campaigns. 
The King of the Goths met little resistance during his campaign after Stilicho’s death, a fact that 
reflects the poor leadership of the Emperor to the army. Emperor Honorius certainly did not have 
the ability to be a strong leader, as can be seen by a popular story after 410 about the Emperor 
supposing that his chicken named “Rome” had perished instead of the city.61 The separated 
Empire of East and West resulted in its own weakness and lack of leadership, eventually leading 
to the disintegrated end of what was once the grand Roman Empire. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
61 Matyszak. The Enemies of Rome. (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd., 2004), 268 
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